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1.  Introduction 
  Two largely independent views of price level determination currently coexist. The first view 
stems from the venerable quantity theory of money. The second view, based on extensions of 
Sargent and Wallace￿s (1981) ￿Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,￿ is the fiscal theory of the 
price level.
1  In their starkest forms, the quantity and fiscal theories are distinguished by which 
nominal government liability is sufficient to determine the price level: in the quantity theory it is 
the money supply and in the fiscal theory it is the quantity of government bonds.  Debate 
between the two views echoes Hicks￿s (1939) characterization as a ￿sham dispute￿ the old 
argument over whether the rate of interest is determined in the loan market or the money market.  
As he put it, with ￿price level￿ in place of his original ￿rate of interest￿: ￿The problem is not one 
of determining [the price level] in vacuo, but it is really the general problem of price-
determination in an economy where ￿ [the price level] is therefore a constituent part of the 
general price-system￿ (p. 153).  This paper argues that for the reasons Hicks lays out it is 
counterproductive to choose between the two theories of price level determination. 
  Hicks (1939) embeds the determination of the overall level of prices in the general problem 
of portfolio choice and asset valuation.  His perspective found formal voice in the work of 
Friedman (1956), Tobin (1961) and Brunner and Meltzer (1972).
2  Because those authors treat 
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1 Recent work includes Leeper (1991, 1993), Sims (1994, 1997, 1999), Woodford (1994, 1995, 
1998a, 1998b, 2001), Bergin (2000), Cochrane (1999, 2001a, 2001b), Daniel (2001a, 2001b), 
Dupor (1997), Mikek (1999), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000).  Important antecedents to the 
recent work include Sargent and Wallace (1981), Begg and Haque (1984), Aiyagari and Gertler 
(1985), Sargent (1986), and Auernheimer and Contreras (1990, 1993). 
2 Other classic analyses include Hicks (1935), Friedman (1948), Tobin (1969, 1980), and 
Brunner and Meltzer (1993).  2
the demand for money symmetrically with the demands for other assets, the equilibrium price 
level emerges from the valuation of all assets jointly.  That treatment suggests that in a modern 
economy, with a wide array of real and nominal assets that vary in return characteristics and 
forms of substitutability, it is futile to try to value one type of asset separately from the rest of the 
portfolio.  Nonetheless, the portfolio choice problems emphasized in earlier analyses often 
receive scant attention.  Asset substitutions are frequently omitted or ignored in both monetary 
theory and empirical estimates of money demand.
3 
  We consider price level determination from the perspective of portfolio choice.  Arbitrages 
among money balances, bonds, and investment goods determine their relative demands.  Returns 
to real balance holdings (transactions services), the nominal interest rate, and after-tax returns to 
investment goods determine the relative values of nominal and real assets.  Since expectations of 
government policies ultimately determine the expected returns to both nominal and real assets, 
monetary and fiscal policies jointly determine the price level.  We focus on circumstances in 
which all sources of fiscal financing distort portfolio choices.  Special cases of the fiscal and 
monetary policies considered produce the quantity theory of money and the fiscal theory of the 
price level. 
  Both the quantity and the fiscal theories, as popularly presented, employ a conventional 
money demand function of the form: 




=  (1) 
where P is the price level, i, the nominal interest rate, is the opportunity cost of money, and y is a 
scale variable.  While empirical specifications like (1) are often justified on grounds of long-run 
stability [see, for example, Friedman (1959), Meltzer (1963), and Lucas (1988)], theoretical 
justifications are more involved: they inform our view of the ￿sham dispute￿ and form the basis 
of this paper. 
  Expression (1) springs from the arbitrage between money and nominal bonds when the 
nominal interest rate suffices to capture the substitutions between these assets.  Missing from (1) 
is the substitution between real and nominal assets￿the ￿Tobin (1965) effect￿￿that expected 
                                                 
3 Important exceptions that do adopt the broad asset substitution perspective of Hicks are Bryant 
and Wallace (1979, 1984) and Wallace (1981, 1989), among others.  Also relevant is the ￿New  3
monetary and fiscal policies might induce.  If those substitutions are also important for 
determining the demand for money, the nominal interest rate does not adequately summarize the 
opportunity cost of money and (1) does not adequately summarize the determinants of the price 
level. 
  Combining a portfolio choice perspective with rational expectations further complicates the 
analysis of price level determination.  The price level depends fundamentally on mutually 
consistent combinations of current and expected future policies.  Current policies affect prices 
both directly and indirectly through changes in expectations of future policies.  Current polices 
may constrain future policy options, if current policies imply debt obligations or future 
expenditure commitments.  Similarly, expected future policies feedback to influence the set of 
current policies that can be chosen.  To answer policy questions, one must consider current and 
future policies jointly.  When any taxes distort portfolio choices, the exact policies implemented 
matter for the price level. 
  A key implication of mutually consistent current and future policies is that changes in current 
fiscal policy must (i) change the real value of government liabilities and therefore change future 
policies; (ii) force the price level to adjust, in which case the money market will clear only if the 
money supply adjusts to satisfy the demand for real money balances; or (iii) some combination 
of (i) and (ii).  The ultimate effect on the price level depends on exactly which policies adjust. 
  From the portfolio choice perspective, the quantity theory and the fiscal theory emerge under 
assumptions on policy that differ in the degree to which monetary policy is constrained to satisfy 
fiscal financing needs.  If monetary policy and government debt play no role in financing real 
government expenditures, then the quantity theory completely describes the path of the price 
level.  The price level is then independent of fiscal policy.  But it is not independent of debt.  The 
level of debt service affects real money balances through its influence on future money creation. 
  The fiscal theory of the price level arises as an extension of unpleasant monetarist arithmetic 
when fiscal obligations together with fixed future policies constrain monetary policy.  A current 
tax cut cannot be financed by higher real debt because future policies are fixed.  Instead, any 
expansion in nominal debt must bring forth a proportional increase in the price level that leaves 
the real value of debt unchanged.  But higher prices raise the demand for nominal money 
                                                                                                                                                             
Monetary Economics￿ associated with Fama (1980), Hall (1982, 1983) and Wallace (1983),  4
balances.  To restore equilibrium, the supply of money must expand passively to return real 
money balances to their original level.  Fiscal financing needs determine the money stock. 
  The portfolio choice perspective does admit pure fiscal effects on the price level that are 
independent of the money stock.  A bond-financed tax cut that generates higher expected taxes 
reduces the expected return to capital and induces substitution from real to nominal assets, 
including money.  This Tobin effect reduces current nominal spending and the price level.  When 
monetary policy does not accommodate fiscal finance, a tax cut has opposite effects on nominal 
demand from those under the fiscal theory. 
  Some versions of the fiscal theory, for example Cochrane (1999, 2001b), start with the 
observation that the equilibrium value of current government debt must equal the present value 
of expected net-of-interest government surpluses.  With all future policies held fixed, the real 
value of government debt is constant, and any change in the current level of debt must be 
associated with a proportional change in the price level.  We show that this seemingly appealing 
inference is misleading.  First, as Cochrane observes, the restriction that debt sells at par is 
critical.  If government debt sells at a discount, an expansion of the quantity of bonds need not 
increase the market value of the issue.  Second, even if bonds sell at a discount, an expansion in 
the real liabilities carried into the future is in general inconsistent with the government budget 
constraint under fixed future policies.  The impact of this policy change ultimately depends on 
how the increased debt liabilities are financed. 
  Thirty years ago the profession was unclear about the precise policy implications of the 
quantity theory of money.
4  Today confusion centers on the fiscal theory of the price level.  
Several authors have criticized its logical foundations and at least three papers have tried to 
explain the fiscal theory.
5  One reason the fiscal theory may be poorly understood is that much of 
the literature focuses on fine theoretical points.  Among these points are: (i) the appropriate 
interpretation of the government￿s budget constraint; (ii) price level indeterminacy and how the 
economy behaves off equilibrium paths; and (iii) how important money and monetary policy are 
under the fiscal theory.  Moreover, expositions of the fiscal theory typically rely on a narrow set 
                                                                                                                                                             
surveyed by Cowen and Kroszner (1987). 
4 See discussions in Gordon (1974) and Stein (1976). 
5 Buiter (1998, 2000) and McCallum (2001) criticize and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999), 
Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) explain.  5
of monetary and fiscal policies.  Lost to these theoretical points and specialized policies is a 
straightforward discussion of price level determination in a general setting with a rich array of 
assets and arbitrary policies.  This paper presents such a setting and argues that none of these 
theoretical points are central to understanding the role of fiscal policy in determining the price 
level.  The combination of portfolio balance, distorting taxes, and mutually consistent current 
and future policies can produce effects of macro policies that differ dramatically from those 
emphasized in existing literature. 
2.  A Simple Model of Portfolio Choice 
  We consider a standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model combined with a transactions 
sector that provides a substitute for the transactions services of money. Private agents may hold a 
nominal substitute for money, government bonds, and a real substitute, capital.  This range of 
substitutions suffices to provide a richer perspective on price level determination than appears in 
much of the recent literature.  Direct taxes are put on an equal footing with inflation taxes￿both 
distort portfolio choices.  Equilibrium is a mapping from current and expected future policy 
variables to portfolio choices and, consequently, equilibrium asset values and the price level. 
2.1   The Model 
  The model consists of a representative household, two firms￿one producing goods and one 
producing transactions services￿and a government. 
  The gross physical assets of the economy at date t,  1 () t f k − , are allocated to consumption,  t c , 
capital,  t k , or government purchases,  t g .  The aggregate resource constraint each period is     
           1 () , tt t t f kc k g − ≥++  (2) 
with 0, 0,  and 0. tt t ck g ≥≥ ≥
6  The function  () f ⋅  is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and 
continuously differentiable. 
                                                 
6 Complete depreciation of capital simplifies many of the expressions without affecting the 
characteristics of the equilibrium that concern us.  For a version of the model with partial 
depreciation of capital, see Gordon, Leeper and Zha (1998).  6
  Two types of representative firms rent factors of production from households and then sell 
their outputs back to households.  Goods producing firms rent k from households at rental rate r 
and pay taxes levied against sales of goods.  Firms choose k to solve 
     11 max   (1 ) ( ) (1 ) , Gt t t t t D fk rk τ −− =− −+  (3) 
taking the tax rate, τ , and r as given. 
  Transactions service producing firms rent labor, l, from households at wage rate w and sell 
transactions services,  ( ) Tl, to households at price  T P . The function  () T ⋅  is strictly increasing, 
strictly concave, and continuously differentiable.  Firms choose l to solve 
     m a x     ( ) , Tt Tt t t t D PTl wl =−  (4) 
taking  T P  and w as given. 
  The household owns the firms and receives factor payments, so its income at the beginning 
of period t is 
     1 (1 ) , tt t G t t t T t I rk D w l D − =+ + + +  (5) 
where DG and DT are dividends received from the goods-producing and transactions-producing 
firms.   
  Households use money balances and transactions services to acquire goods.  Transactions 
services purchased from the financial sector at time t execute the fraction  [0,1] t T ∈  of private 
expenditures on goods.  Choices of money and services must satisfy the finance constraint: 
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where  1 t M −  is nominal money balances carried into period t and  t P  is the price level at t.
7 
Transactions services may be thought of as a clearinghouse, money market mutual funds, or 
credit cards, although our specification abstracts from any institutional details.  In advanced 
economies, where most transactions involve the financial sector but do not involve cash directly, 
T may be close to unity on average.  Holding resources devoted to the financial sector fixed, the 
                                                 
7 Including investment goods in the finance constraint, as in Stockman (1981), is substantive.  
Excluding investment goods implies that the acts of investing or reallocating investments do not 
generate any demand for money or for transactions services.  7
constraint implies that doubling the value of transactions doubles the value of transactions 
performed with services by doubling the size of each transaction.  It also implies that the 
marginal product of transactions services increases with the value of transactions performed.
8 
  Preferences are defined over consumption and leisure.  The current period utility function, 
() U ⋅ , is time-separable, strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave, and continuously 
differentiable.  Households are endowed with one unit of time each period and choose c, k, l, T, 
M, and B, nominal bonds, to solve
9 
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subject to the budget constraint 
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and the finance constraint, (6), with 0 1 t l ≤≤ , , , tT t t P Pi  and  t τ  taken as given, and the initial 
conditions () 11 1 1 ,, ( 1) kM iB −− − − + .
10  Total government expenditures, g, are financed by printing 
money, M, and selling nominal bonds, B, which pay a net nominal interest rate of i, and levying a 
proportional tax rate, τ , against net output.  The government￿s budget constraint is 















++ =  (9) 
  Let the state of the economy at the beginning of each period be given by the resources 
available to the private sector and expected sequences of future policies.  At time t the state is 
                                                 
8 The specification is in the spirit of Tobin with Golub￿s (1998) characterization of Baumol￿s 
(1952) and Tobin￿s (1956) theories of cash inventories, where economies of scale ￿result from 
costs that are as large for hundred-dollar transactions as for million-dollar transactions￿ [Tobin 
with Golub (1998), p. 49].  The specification is also in keeping with Friedman￿s (1956) view of 
the myriad ways that households and firms may create substitutes for money in transactions. 
9 One can imagine the representative household composed of a worker/shopper pair.  Each 
member of the household is endowed with a unit of time each period and specializes in the 
production of a specific commodity.  The worker supplies labor inelastically to the goods 
producing firm and the shopper supplies labor elastically to the transactions services producing 
firm.  The worker￿s labor supply is unity and the shopper￿s labor supply is l. 
10 The operator E in (7) denotes equilibrium expectations of private agents over future policy.  
Although we focus on perfect foresight equilibria, we employ the notation  t E  to distinguish 
between current and past policies (dated t and earlier) and future policies (dated s t > ).  8
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−− − − = =+ , where ρ  is money growth,  1 tt t M M ρ − = , and 
g s  is the government-spending share,  1 ()
g
tt t s gf k − = .  Rational expectations require that 
expected policies are consistent with equilibrium.  A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium is 
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  To obtain an explicit characterization of the model￿s equilibrium, we specialize the model by 
assuming the following functional forms for the production functions and for preferences: 
     11 ( ) ,     0 1 tt fk k
σ σ −− =< ≤  (10) 
        ( ) 1 ( 1) ,       1 tt Tl l
α α =− − >  (11) 
        ( ,1 ) ln( ) ln(1 ),     0 . tt t t Uc l c l γγ α −= + − < <  (12) 
First-Order Conditions 
  The firms￿ first-order conditions are: 
 
1
1 1 :1 ( 1 )  , tt t t kr k
σ στ
−
− − += −  (13) 
 
1 :( 1 ) . tt t T t lw l P
α α
− =−  (14) 
 Letting  ϕ  be the lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint and λ  be the multiplier for the 
finance constraint, the household￿s first-order conditions are: 
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11 We prefer this conventional definition of equilibrium over the non-standard one employed by 
Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) in their explanation of the fiscal theory.  Their definition 
includes the puzzling description of policy behavior as simultaneously taking the price level 



































   11 :        (1 ) . tt t t t t t t kT E r ϕ λλ βϕ ++ += + +  (20) 
  Expressions (18)-(20) price assets and (17) prices transactions services.  Interconnections 
among the asset pricing equations make it clear that price level determination is only one 
component of a general portfolio choice problem.  Only under special circumstances that 
effectively decouple (18) and (19) from (20) can nominal assets be priced independently of the 
real asset.
12  
2.2  The Equilibrium 
  We characterize the equilibrium at time t in terms of two policy expectations functions, 
(,) tt µ η , current government claims to goods, 
g
t s , and beginning-of-period assets, 
() 11 1 1 ,, ( 1) tt t t kM iB −− − − + .  A solution maps expectations of policy into portfolio choices, where 
those expectations are restricted to policy paths consistent with market clearing, the resource 
constraint, and budget constraints.  The functions ( , ) tt µ η  summarize everything agents need to 
know to form rational expectations about the equilibrium of the economy. 
  As detailed below, η  and µ  capture the portfolio balance effects of expected policies. η , a 
product of solving the first-order condition for capital, measures the direct tax distortion on 
investment as well as the extent to which government expenditures are financed by taxing 
output.  A rise in expected future taxes lowers η  and lowers investment.    µ , a product of solving 
the first-order condition for money, reflects expected inflation and thus the expected return on 
nominal assets.  Higher expected inflation lowers µ  and lowers the demand for money. 
  Although in general the equilibrium depends on the entire expected paths of future policies, it 
is convenient to focus on circumstances in which the economy is in a stationary equilibrium for 
dates s t >  but starts from some other equilibrium at t.  Assume: 
                                                 
12 Necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum are (6), (8), (9), (13)-(20) plus 
transversality conditions for  tt M P ,  tt B P , and  t k .  10
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  Define the private savings rate as  () tt tt s kck =+.  In equilibrium that rate is
13 









and (the inverse of) the velocity of money, 1 t T − , is 
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where 



























−  −  =
 −
−  − 
 (24) 
and 













=  −  

 (25) 
Signs appearing in parentheses above the function arguments in (24) and (25) denote partial 
derivatives of the functions with respect to future values of the policy variables. 
  The equilibrium capital stock is 
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and equilibrium real money balances are  
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 (27) 
In (27), µ  substitutes for the nominal interest rate, as arbitrage between nominal assets implies 
                                                 
13 Appendix A solves the model.  11











Equilibrium nominal interest rates depend only on expected future money growth. 
3.  Price Level Determination 
   In the equilibrium outlined above expectations of government policies determine the returns 
on money holdings, bonds, and real investments, and therefore determine the price level.  This 
section derives the implications for the price level of various policies and explores the tradeoffs 
between current and expected policies that are consistent with equilibrium. 
3.1  Policy Expectations and the Price Level 
  The velocity equation, (27), determines the price level, given the policy expectations 
functions  t µ  and  t η .  Equilibrium real balances are 
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 (31) 
  µ  and η  capture three distinct aspects of the influence of policy expectations on the price 
level.  The first works through µ , the marginal value of end-of-period real money balances, 
which is ubiquitous in dynamic monetary models.  All else equal, changes in µ  imply changes in 
expected inflation and the rate of return on money holdings, producing the direct effects of 
monetary policy.  Expectation of a higher rate of money growth depreciates the real value of 
money, lowers µ , induces substitution away from money, and raises the equilibrium price level. 
  η   captures a Tobin effect through two interdependent impacts of expected policies.  One 
impact is a direct tax distortion, which alters the private return on real assets.  To isolate this  12
effect, consider the impact of higher expected future taxes, holding future money growth and 
government-spending shares fixed.  Further suppose that debt is identically zero and, in order to 
focus on substitution effects, that the revenues collected through higher distorting taxes are 
rebated as a lump sum.  Higher future tax rates reduce the expected return on investment and 
induce agents to substitute from capital into consumption.  A lower expected return on capital 
also induces substitutions into nominal assets, including money, and produces the Tobin effect.  
With the current money stock fixed, higher money demand drives down the price level today. 
  A second impact comes from η ￿s summary of the composition of expected fiscal financing in 
terms of the relative sizes of the real and the inflation tax bases.  Higher η  reflects an increase in 
expected nominal liability creation, a rise in the inflation tax base, and a reduction in the role of 
real taxation in financing government expenditures.  This tradeoff can be seen heuristically from 
an alternative expression for the terms (1 ) (1 )
g s τ −−  that appear in the definition of η  in (24).  
A transformation of the government budget constraint yields: 
     () 11 1
1
(1 ) 1
1,    0 .
1( 1 ) ( )
tt t t tt t
gg
tt t









Terms in (1 ) (1 )
g s τ −−  reflect the fraction of private resources absorbed by the acquisition of 
new nominal liabilities issued by the government.  Higher η  indicates an expected shift in future 
financing that expands the inflation tax base and contracts the real tax base.  By reflecting the 
relative sizes of the two tax bases, changes in η  generate an expected inflation effect that is not 
embedded in the nominal interest rate.  Whenever policies change η , the conventional money 
demand expression in (1) will mispredict the impacts of future policies on the price level. 
3.2  Equilibrium Policies 
  The preceding discussion focused on how changes in rates of return on real and nominal 
assets affect the price level and how the rates of return relate to government policies.  Well-
posed policy questions require complete specification of current and future policies.  Even 
standard questions like ￿What are the impacts of an increase in the expected growth rate of 
money?￿ or ￿What are the effects of an increase in the expected tax rate?￿ must be linked to 
other policies to satisfy the equilibrium conditions and clear the government budget constraint. 
  Suppose expectations are initially consistent with equilibrium, and that agents expect future 
government expenditures to be financed by money creation or tax receipts.  Absent some other  13
change in government expenditures or taxes, an increase in the growth rate of money (a decline 
in µ ) increases seigniorage in the future, and neither current nor future government budget 
constraints are satisfied.  Similarly, a rise in the expected tax rate (a fall in η  )  is consistent with 
equilibrium only if it is associated with an appropriate expected change in future money growth, 
government spending, or debt creation. 
  Not only do current policies constrain future policy options, but also variations in fiscal 
financing in the future require changes in current policy.  Any change in expected future policy 
that affects the current price level will alter the real values of current changes in money and debt.  
As a result, the government budget constraint will continue to be satisfied only under specific 
circumstances. 
  To analyze how jointly consistent combinations of changes in current and future policy affect 
the price level, we must consider 
which policy combinations are consistent with equilibrium given current expectations (µ  and η ) ; 
and 
how current policy changes affect the set of future policies that are consistent with equilibrium￿
that is, which policy expectations are rational.  
  The government budget constraint in period t yields policy combinations that satisfy 0 given 
current expectations: 
















 −+ −   +− ⋅ ∆ =    −   
 (33) 
where () s ss B MB M ≡  and  t ∆ , defined in (30), summarizes the given expected policies.
14   
  We now characterize which future (date F) policies satisfy 0, given the state of government 
indebtedness at date t.  The current state of indebtedness is captured by the bond-to-money ratio 
at the end of period t, () t B M .  Assume that future interest liabilities are correctly anticipated at 
time t and that the bond-to-money ratio is constant at () F BM  in the future stationary 
equilibrium.  Re-labeling variables dated  1 t +  with an ￿F ￿ subscript and imposing a stationary 
equilibrium yields: 
                                                 
14 Details of the derivations underlying (33) and (34) appear in Appendix B.  14
















   −   ∆=    −  −    −+     
      
 (34) 
Given government indebtedness at the end of period t, expression (34) describes the tradeoffs 
among future policies consistent with equilibrium and a given set of current policies; that is, it 
reports policies that satisfy (37) with  t ∆  constant.
15 
  To deduce the impacts on the price level of changes in monetary and fiscal policy, the 
contemplated policies must satisfy relationships (33) and (34).  Those relationships imply that 
standard questions about the impacts of policy changes or changes in expectations may not be 
consistent with equilibrium now or in the future, and must be reinterpreted after being coupled 
with policies that jointly determine the equilibrium.   
3.3  The Effects of Changing Policy Expectations 
3.3.1  Expected Inflation 
  We have already considered the usual description of the effects of an increase in expected 
inflation due to an increase in expected money growth.  The expected inflation rate rises, the real 
return on money holdings falls (µ  falls), and the current price level rises.  If we start from an 
initial equilibrium in which the government has a positive return from net money and bond 
growth, this cannot be the total adjustment because the real value of current nominal liability 
creation has fallen and neither current nor future government budget constraints are satisfied. 
  The full effect of the change in expected monetary policy depends on the changes in other 
policy expectations that produce the new equilibrium.  A decrease in future taxes or an increase 
in future government spending generates a substitution away from money and towards real 
saving.  This substitution further increases the current price level.  Higher expected money 
growth directly raises the price level and reduces the real return to current nominal liability 
creation.  If current taxes rise to offset the loss in revenue, there is no additional impact on the 
price level because private real resources are unchanged.  If government spending falls instead, 
                                                 
15 We focus on government fiscal obligations in the form of debt, but any expenditure 
commitments, such as spending programs, Medicare, or Social Security, that constrain future 
policy options are subject to the same analysis.       15
private resources increase, raising the demand for money and moderating the effect on the price 
level. 
3.3.2  Tax Policy Expectations 
  In section 3.1 we considered the direct effects of changes in expected taxes (through η ).  A 
fall in the expected future tax rate produces an increase in current capital investment, substitution 
away from nominal assets, and a rise in the current price level.  Again, the resulting fall in 
government revenues is not consistent with equilibrium, in either the current period or in the 
future, without some further adjustment in policy.   If the fall in expected tax receipts is 
compensated for by an increase in expected money growth, expected inflation rises and the rise 
in the current price level is exacerbated.  The result is identical to the analysis above of a change 
in expected money growth with the tax rate adjusting to retain the same level of government 
spending.  Indeed, it is arbitrary to refer to one of the policy expectations as adjusting to a change 
in the other.  The price change results from a shift in the combination of policy expectations that 
are consistent with equilibrium. 
  In contrast, suppose the fall in the expected tax rate is associated with an equal decline in 
expected government spending and no change in money growth.  Under the assumption that 
there is an expected government deficit (
g
FF s τ > ),  t η  falls.   Τ his change in expectations directly 
increases the demand for money and decreases the price level.  Neither current nor future 
government budget constraints clear with this policy change alone.  A lower current price level 
increases the real return to money creation.  Similarly, the rise in the government-spending share 
in the future implies that the price level in the future rises, decreasing expected seigniorage (a 
decline in the seigniorage tax base with no change in the stationary inflation rate reduces 
seigniorage revenues).  With unchanged monetary policy, future taxes must rise more than 
government spending, moderating the impact on the current price level. 
  Expected fiscal policy may affect the price level independently of monetary policy.  Consider 
the impact on the price level of the substitution between current and future taxes that a debt-
financed tax cut induces.  If the sequences of money growth rates and government-spending 
shares, { , , , }
g g
tF tF s s ρρ , are fixed exogenously, a bond-financed tax cut at t increases government 
liabilities in the future and necessitates some change in future policy, as (34) indicates.  In the 
spirit of a Ricardian experiment, suppose that future direct taxes rise.  Higher  F τ  reduces the  16
expected return on physical capital.  A lower return on the real asset relative to nominal assets 
increases the value of the current stock of money and bonds and reduces velocity.  With the 
money stock fixed, the price level at time t falls.  A Tobin effect gives debt a natural role in 
determining the price level, and a role that is independent of the stock of money.  This pure fiscal 
effect from a tax cut reduces nominal demand and the price level. 
  One consequence of the policy change is that even though money growth is constant, 
seigniorage revenues rise with the lower price level, due to the impacts of future taxes on the 
demand for money and equilibrium real money balances.  Of course, the change in seigniorage is 
a consequence of the fiscally induced change in the price level. 
4.  The Quantity Theory and The Fiscal Theory of The Price Level 
  Our perspective on price determination emphasizes that the price level depends on jointly 
consistent current and expected policies.  This analysis does not conflict with either the quantity 
theory of money or the fiscal theory of the price level: each theory arises from particular sets of 
restrictions on policies. 
4.1  The Quantity Theory of Money 
  The quantity theory is sometimes described as positing strict proportionality between the 
supply of money and the aggregate price level, and delivering the corresponding neutrality of 
money.  Friedman (1956) rejects this depiction as too extreme and provides a short description of 
the quantity theoretic perspective.  His description includes (a) a demand for money relation that 
depends on a restricted set of variables and (b) an assumption that the money demand function is 
stable.
16 
  Even in the simple model considered here, (a) is satisfied only if the restricted set of 
variables includes the parameters of the processes determining policy.  In addition, those 
parameters must be observable.  To satisfy (b) we must add the strong assumption that the policy 
process is ￿stable￿ in some well-defined sense.  We now explore (a) and (b). 
  The velocity equation is often expressed in the form of an equilibrium ￿money demand￿ 
function.  While not formally a demand function, it has the familiar form of including an index 
                                                 
16 Friedman also requires a degree of independence between the factors determining the supply 
and demand for money.  We have nothing to add on this point.  17
of expenditures and a measure of opportunity cost.  Although Friedman￿s (1956) general demand 
function includes a role for expected inflation that is independent of the nominal interest rate, 
most monetary analyses include only this rate-of-return influence of expected inflation [for 
example Laidler (1985)]. 
  Expected inflation affects the demand for money by changing the own return on nominal 
money balances, which is embedded in the nominal interest rate, i.  A second expected inflation 
effect operates through the composition of future fiscal financing, which η  summarizes.  
Changes in η  trigger the asset substitutions that generate the Tobin effect.  The velocity equation, 
expressed in terms of the nominal interest rate, is: 
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11












=−  − 
 (35) 
  This expression underscores that the nominal interest rate is generally an inadequate measure 
of the opportunity cost of money balances.  Without auxiliary assumptions that eliminate the 
Tobin effect and the corresponding substitutions between real and nominal assets, the nominal 
rate incompletely summarizes the opportunity cost.  
  Special policy assumptions are necessary for the price level to be determined by monetary 
policy alone.  Those assumptions result in a dichotomy between the nominal and real sides of the 
economy, but not an independence of the price level from debt.  Consider a policy that sets the 
net-of-interest budget surplus to zero each period, so 
g
tt s τ =  for all t.  In this special case, the 
model delivers a simple quantity theory because  (1 / )/(1 ) t η σ βγ ασ β =− −  for all t.  This policy 
removes substitutions between nominal and real assets, so the demand for money stems entirely 
from arbitrage between bonds and money.  Equilibrium real balances reduce to 







=+ (36)  18
which is analogous to the specification in (1).  Now the price level is independent of fiscal 
policy, but it is not independent of debt unless debt is zero: money growth must finance the 
interest obligations, so the level of debt matters for the level of real money balances.
17 
4.2  Representations of Money Demand 
     Friedman (1956) presents the demand for money as a function of a vector of rates of return on 
money and alternative forms of wealth.  It is evident that stability of the simple money demand 
relation in (36) requires special assumptions about fiscal policy.  We now relax those 
assumptions to ask whether expectations of fiscal policy summarized by η  in (35) can be 
replaced by a judicious choice of rates of return.   
  Can (35) be converted into a simple and stable money demand relation if it is expressed in 
terms of a real return and expected inflation, as Friedman argues?  Because the real interest rate 
described by r includes transactions costs, no simple relation links it to the nominal rate and the 
expected inflation rate.  A simple Fisher relation can be obtained by adjusting the real rate for 
transactions costs.  Let 
*
1 t r+  denote the net real rate of return on capital between t and  1 t +  after 
adjusting for transactions costs.  The net-of-transactions-costs real intertemporal marginal rate of 
transformation is given by 
    
*
11 (1 ) . tt t t Er ϕβ ϕ ++ =+  (37) 
Simplification yields the simple Fisher equation 
    
*
11 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) . tt t t iE r π ++ += + +  (38) 
Combining this simple Fisher equation with (35) yields an equivalent version of (35) in terms of 
expected inflation and the real return on capital adjusted for transactions costs: 
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 (39) 
This money demand relation is stable only under certain assumptions about fiscal policy. 
                                                 
17 Of course, with lump-sum taxes in place of the distorting tax, the quantity theory and 
Ricardian equivalence hold under the wider range of policies described in Leeper (1991) as 
￿active monetary￿ and ￿passive fiscal￿ policies [see also Woodford (1999) or Cochrane 
(2001b)].  The convention of using lump-sum taxes in association with the quantity theory is 
consistent with Friedman￿s (1976, p. 311) ￿Marshallian approach to theory,￿ as opposed to 
￿Tobin￿s Walrasian approach.￿  19
  An alternative expression involving the real rate of return, r, may be obtained using the 
capital Euler equation, (20): 
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 (40) 
Using (40) yields another equivalent, although somewhat more complicated equilibrium money 
demand relation in terms of expected inflation, the expected return on capital, and expected fiscal 
variables: 
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 (41) 
Effects of expected fiscal policies continue to appear separately through η .
18  Brunner and 
Meltzer (1972) specify a money demand function that includes the expected real return on real 
assets, an argument closely related to η . 
  There has also been extensive discussion about the appropriate scale variable in a money 
demand relation.  While it may be more informative because of relative stability, measurement, 
or information problems to use one specification or another, there is no theoretical basis for the 
choice.  It is logically equivalent to express the equilibrium demand for real balances in terms of 
private expenditures yields, as in (35), or in terms of consumption, as in 













=  − 
 (42) 
  On a theoretical level there is no basis for distinguishing among these various representations 
of equilibrium M P .  They may have some descriptive value in terms of the nature of the 
substitutions at work, but they are not structural relationships.  Moreover, because expectations 
of policy enter as arguments in all these relationships, strong assumptions are necessary for these 
relationships to be stable over time.
19    
                                                 
18 Adding a long-term nominal interest rate, as Meltzer (1963) and Lucas (1988) do, still does not 
eliminate the Tobin effect from the money demand function.  Arbitrage between the one-period 
bond and the long-term bond implies that the equilibrium long rate also depends only on 
expected money creation. 
19 Lucas (1988) makes a similar observation about the money demand function he derives by 
presenting agents with a portfolio problem.  20
  Friedman argues that if asset substitutions are very stable, the price level can be determined 
without analyzing all the margins relevant in the general specification.  This argument may be 
without fault on a theoretical level.  It may also be consistent with some broad empirical 
regularities.  But our analysis is another example of circumstances under which it is misguided to 
treat an empirically stable relationship involving real money balances as identifying structural 
elements of the economy. 
4.3  ￿Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic￿ as a Fiscal Theory 
  Sargent and Wallace (1981) develop an environment in which fiscal policy drives inflation.  
In their example, limitations on tax receipts result in a fiscal responsibility for the monetary 
authority.  As Sargent (1986) emphasizes, this perspective places responsibility for controlling 
inflation equally on monetary and fiscal authorities. 
  The potential for unpleasant arithmetic arises in the present model when considering an open 
market operation.  Consider a bond sale with  tt M B +  fixed.  In addition, fix the sequence 
{,}
g g
tF s s  and the current value of  t τ .  Because the open-market sale raises future government 
indebtedness, it is clear that some policy must change in the future.  With government-spending 
shares fixed exogenously, either future taxes,  F τ , or future money growth,  F ρ , must rise to 
accommodate the increase in debt service. Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic arises when 
individuals expect higher money growth in the future, which lowers the expected return on 
money (lower µ ), decreases money demand, and raises the price level.  This effect is 
counteracted by the direct negative effect on the price level from the decrease in  t M  due to the 
open-market sale.  The ultimate effect on the price level can go either way, and depends on how 
much future money growth must adjust following an open-market operation to be consistent with 
equilibrium.  The change in future money growth, in turn, depends on the bond-money ratio at 
the time of the nominal asset exchange.  To see this, note that the proportion by which () t B M  
changes from a given open-market operation varies with the initial bond-money ratio.  And the 
larger the change in B M , the greater is the change in debt service and, therefore, money growth 
and inflation in the future.  21
  Price level changes from open-market operations depend on the corresponding changes in 
policy expectations, and on the state of government indebtedness.
20  State-dependence of the 
price effects of changes in money supply produced by normal central bank procedures arises 
from fiscal considerations frequently overlooked in conventional monetary analyses.  
4.4  The Canonical Fiscal Theory Exercise 
  Like the quantity theory, the fiscal theory can be understood as eliminating all substitutions 
between real and nominal assets, and emerges as a special case of the general analysis above. 
What we term the ￿canonical￿ fiscal theory exercise stems from the policy assumptions in 
Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), and Woodford (1995), among many others.
21  This exercise restricts 
asset substitution to occur only between current nominal assets. 
  Assume all future policies, ( , , )
g
FFF s ρτ , and 
g
t s  are fixed.  These policies make  t η  constant 
and equilibrium real money balances again reduce to (1).  They also peg the nominal interest 
rate.  Under these assumptions, consider the impact of a bond-financed tax cut, so  t τ  falls and  t B  
rises.  Can this be equilibrium?  The government budget constraint (34) implies it cannot.  If 
current money growth is unchanged, then future government liabilities, summarized by() t B M , 
rise.  Some future policy must change.  There is only one equilibrium consistent with unchanged 
future policies; that equilibrium arises when current money growth expands to prevent () t B M  
from rising when nominal debt expands.  Expression (33) yields the monetary adjustment 
required when  t τ  is reduced, if future government liabilities are to remain unchanged.  Note that 
future money growth is held fixed.  The current monetary expansion required to maintain 
equilibrium is exactly enough so that the increase in future seigniorage (because the level of 
money supplied is now higher) at the fixed rate of monetary growth just suffices to pay for the 
increased debt service.  To determine the effect on the equilibrium price level, note that fixing 
(, ,,)
g g
tF F F s s ρτ  pegs the nominal interest rate and determines a constant level of real money 
                                                 
20 Sargent and Wallace (1981) also have state-dependent price effects from open-market 
operations. 
21 Brunner and Meltzer (1972) present an early version of the fiscal theory in an environment 
with a money demand function similar to ours.  22
balances.  The new higher level of  t M , together with (27), yield the new higher equilibrium 
price level.
22 
  The fiscal theory contrasts with the bond-financed tax cut examined in section 3.3.2.  That 
bond-financed tax cut was pure fiscal policy in the sense that it was independent of the stock of 
money.  It also reduced nominal spending and the price level.  An essential aspect of the fiscal 
theory is that the current money stock must adjust to clear the money market.
23  This makes a tax 
cut expand nominal demand and raise the price level. 
  Designating either the fiscal policy change or the response of monetary policy as the source 
of the price level change is completely arbitrary.  But as in unpleasant arithmetic, monetary 
policy is constrained by the government￿s fiscal obligations. 
4.5  Taking the Government Budget Constraint Seriously 
  Does the intertemporal government budget constraint determine the price level?  Some 
expositions of the fiscal theory may make it seem so.  Cochrane (1999, 2001b), for example, 
focuses attention on the government￿s intertemporal budget constraint: 





=  (43) 
Woodford (1995, p. 12) writes that ￿￿it is often more useful to think of [the government￿s 
present value budget constraint, (43)] rather than [equilibrium real money balances, (29)] as the 
equilibrium condition that determines the equilibrium price level at date t.￿  This leads to direct 
inferences based on (43) such as, lower expected surpluses or higher current nominal debt raise 
the price level.  These seemingly appealing inferences are misleading for two reasons. 
  First, as Cochrane (2001a) correctly observes, (43) assumes that government bonds sell at 
par.  If instead bonds sells at price  t q , then the left-hand-side of the equation is  / tt t qB P.  Now 
higher  t B  may raise the price of bonds, leaving the real market value of debt,  / tt t qB P, and the 
price level unchanged.  We agree with Cochrane that (43) is really a ￿valuation equation￿ for 
nominal government debt. 
                                                 
22 Again, with lump-sum taxes, a range of policies is consistent with the fiscal theory.  Leeper 
(1991) labels them ￿active fiscal￿ and ￿passive monetary￿ policies.  23
  Second, even if one incorporates Cochrane￿s observation, higher  t B  and unchanged  / tt t qB P 
and  t P  cannot be an equilibrium.  The real liabilities of the government have increased in the 
future (future debt service increased).  Some future policy must change.  The ultimate effect on 
the price level depends on which policy the private sector expects will adjust. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
  This paper takes a portfolio choice perspective in which the price level depends generically 
on all current and expected future monetary and fiscal policies.  Generic dependence of the price 
level comes from the presence of distorting taxes and an insistence that current and future 
policies be jointly consistent with equilibrium. 
  This perspective also delivers a money demand function that depends on the nominal interest 
rate, a scale variable, and expected tax and government spending policies.  Expected fiscal 
policies cannot be replaced by a vector of real rates of return, expected inflation, a long-term 
interest rate, or other typical arguments of money demand. 
  The quantity and fiscal theories emerge under restrictions on policy behavior that eliminate 
substitutions between real and nominal assets.  When, in addition, neither money creation nor 
debt expansion finances fiscal expenditures, a conventional quantity theory of money emerges.  
When all future policies are fixed and the current money stock adjusts passively to satisfy money 
demand at the pegged nominal interest rate, the fiscal theory of the price level is reproduced. 
  Although the required policy restrictions are severe, they are revealing about conditions 
under which either the quantity theory or the fiscal theory is likely to prevail.  During periods 
when direct tax revenues approximately cover government spending and monetary policy is 
conducting routine open-market operations, the quantity theory should hold well.  On the other 
hand, periods when the central bank supports bond prices (as it might during wars), should find 
that fiscal policy plays a larger role in determining the price level. 
  These restrictions also point toward circumstances when the quantity theory and the fiscal 
theory are likely to breakdown.  Those circumstances include periods when expectations of fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 Models with a single asset make the logical point that the fiscal theory can be independent of 
money: Woodford￿s (1998b, 1998c) ￿cashless limit￿; Sims￿s (1997) model with nominal bonds 
and no money; Cochrane￿s (2001b) model with zero overnight money demand.  24
policy change in important ways, triggering substitutions between real and nominal assets.  The 
Tobin effect should be important for large changes in macro policies, including tax reforms, big 
new spending initiatives, or changes in the inflation target pursued by the central bank.  These 
circumstances call for a more general money demand specification than commonly appears in 
macro models. 
  An insistence that either the quantity theory or the fiscal theory governs the price level is 
extremely limiting.  Those theories are powerful in their simplicity but require strong 
assumptions on policy behavior that are unlikely to hold generally.  We have offered a broader 
perspective that admits the two theories as special cases.  The combination of portfolio choice 
and mutually consistent current and expected macro policies applies generally, with only a small 
sacrifice in simplicity.   25
Appendix A: Solving The Model 
  This appendix describes how to solve the model given the first-order conditions (13)-(20), 
the aggregate resource constraint, (2), and the finance constraint, (6). 
  Define the private savings rate as  () tt tt s kck =+ and the government￿s share of output as 
1 ()
g
tt t s gf k − = . The equilibrium savings rate is given by the solution to the Euler equation for 
capital, which implies the difference equation: 
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 (A.1) 
The solution to (A.1) is 
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∑ ∏  (A.3) 
  The Euler equation for money is solved analogously.  Letting  1 tt t M M ρ − =  denote the 
growth rate of the money supply, the Euler equation is 
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 (A.4) 
The solution is:   
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where 
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  This delivers expressions (22) and (23) in the text.  26
Appendix B: The Government Budget Constraint 
  This appendix uses the model￿s equilibrium together with the government budget constraint 
to obtain the equilibrium connections among current and future policies.  Those connections are 
used in section 3.2 where particular policy rules are studied. 
  Using expression (27) for equilibrium real balances, the government budget constraint in 
period t can be written as 
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 (B.1) 
where  
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 (B.3) 
Given expectations of policy, as embodied in  t ∆ , (B.3) reports the tradeoffs that exist in 
equilibrium among current policies, given the initial conditions summarized by 
() 111 (1 ) . ttt iB M −−− +  
  We now seek to characterize the tradeoffs that exist among future policies given the current 
state of government indebtedness.  Combine the equilibrium nominal interest obtained from the 
arbitrage between money and bonds, 











with the recursive representation of µ , 
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Substitute (B.6) into (B.3) and push the dating forward one period to obtain  27
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 (B.7) 
Under the assumption of perfect foresight, policy choices at t+1 are known at t, so the 
equilibrium nominal interest rate adjusts to those choices.  Then (B.7) may be rewritten as 
    
11 1 1
1





tt t t t
t g
tt t t t t
BB s
MM s




++ + + +
  −
−+ − + ∆ =   −  
 (B.8) 
Denote future values by an ￿F ￿ subscript, consistent with the assumptions about policy in (21), 
and denote current values by a ￿t￿ subscript.  If B M  is constant in the future at the ratio 
() F BM , so nominal debt grows at the same rate,  F ρ , as money, then substituting for  1 t+ ∆  and 
imposing future values, 
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which reduces to 
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Substitute for  1 t µ +  and  1 t η +  from (25) and (24) to obtain 
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Expression (B.11) can be rewritten in the form 
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 (B.12) 
Given the state of government indebtedness at t, as summarized by () t B M , with which the 
economy enters the stationary equilibrium in periods s t > , (B.12) characterizes the tradeoffs 
among future policies in equilibrium.  
  Using (B.2), together with (25), (24), and (B.12),  28
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  (B.3) and (B.14) deliver expressions (33) and (34) in the text.  29
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